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JOHN I. FORRY* and
PERRY A. LERNERt

Taxing Multinational Enterprises:
Basic Issues of International
Income Tax Harmonization
Income taxation is an important factor in the economic planning and performance of a multinational enterprise, and consequently can be significant in
regulating the operations of such enterprises. Multinational enterprises now
devote considerable attention to compliance with and planning for the complex
and often contradictory tax regimes in the countries in which they invest and do
business. In recent years taxation of multinational enterprises has also received
increased attention by national and international governmental bodies. Various
groups within the United Nations, the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development, the European Economic Community, and the United States
Congress and Department of the Treasury are currently reviewing and developing guidelines for the taxation of multinational enterprises. I Principal among
their considerations have been the identification and harmonization of conflicting income tax systems and goals. This article summarizes-without detailed
technical analysis-the basic issues and approaches involved in such international income tax harmonization.
The Impact of Multiple Taxing Jurisdictions
Source vs. Residence Taxation and Tax Neutrality
Income that arises in one country and then flows to another country-business profits, dividends, interest, royalties and so forth-is generally taxed by
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both countries according to their respective laws. The source country claims the
right to tax the income on the ground that the activities giving rise to the income
occurred there, while the recipient's country claims the right to tax the income
on the basis of the recipient's residence. If taxation by the two countries is not
coordinated, a heavier tax burden may be imposed on such income than on
domestic income, with a consequent decrease in foreign trade and investment.
If, for example, a royalty payment having a source in Country A bears a 30%
withholding tax in that country and is also subject to a 50% tax in the recipient's
country of residence, the aggregate tax burden with respect to the payment will
be substantially higher than if the payment originated and was received in the
recipient's home country. Alternatively, lack of coordination may grant income
from foreign trade or investment unintended tax benefits, where, for example,
income is free from tax in both the source and residence countries. In either
event, taxation induces a distortion of allocation of capital among countries.
Double taxation often arises from rational but competing concepts of tax
neutrality in residence and source countries. Most countries seek to effect some
form of tax neutrality with respect to foreign trade and investment, so that such
trade and investment is neither encouraged nor burdened by their respective tax
systems. On the one hand, a country such as the United States may wish to tax
each of its citizens, residents and domestic corporations on its worldwide
income in order to avoid creating a tax incentive in favor of foreign investment
over domestic investment. On the other hand, other countries may wish to tax
equally income from similar assets or activities in the same physical locale or
source, even though worldwide taxation by another country will reach the same
item of income. Many countries, including the United States, tax on both bases,
with nonresidents generally subject only to source taxation.
Source and Residence Definitions
Even while two countries tax principally on the basis of the source of income,
their rules for determining the source may differ so that both tax the same item
of income. For example, certain countries regard the source of royalty payments
as the residence of the payor, while other countries consider the source to be
where the property giving rise to the royalty is used. In addition, an enterprise
organized under one country's laws and managed in another country may risk
treatment as a tax resident by both countries. However, in certain cases neither
country's source rules may treat a specific item as having a local source, so that
the payment may escape tax entirely. Certain countries, for example, have not
taxed operations on their continental shelves on the theory that their taxing
jurisdiction does not extend beyond the shoreline. Likewise the definition of a
local establishment subject to source taxation often differs from country to
country. In less likely circumstances, an enterprise may avoid tax residence in a
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country imposing worldwide taxation, and also may avoid taxation under source
rules of countries from which it derives income.
Double Taxation of CorporateEarnings
Many domestic tax systems purposely impose double taxation on corporate
profits distributed to shareholders-once at the corporate level and once at the
shareholder level. Such taxation is traditional within the United States tax
system, as well as that of many other countries. This form of double taxation
may be mitigated by reducing or eliminating the second level of taxation on
dividends distributed to corporate shareholders. Such rules postpone the double
taxation of income remaining in corporate solution until dividends are paid to
individual shareholders, and facilitate at least intercorporate capital transfers.
However, this tax benefit often is not extended to dividends received from a
foreign corporation, resulting in an additional tax burden on foreign trade and
investment. Even where countries have adopted integrated tax systems for
distributions to individual shareholders, nonresident shareholders are often
denied the benefit of the refunds or credits which effect the amelioration of the
tax burden on corporate earnings.
Direct vs. Indirect Taxation
The economic impact of double taxation or the avoidance of tax varies-at
least theoretically-with the kind of tax involved. A tax imposed on net income,
such as gross receipts less investment and operating costs, is generally a direct
tax-one which the taxpayer is unable to pass on to his customer because he is
unable to predict the precise amount of tax at the time of the transaction. For a
multinational enterprise engaged in substantially the same types of transactions
over several years in substantially the same economic environments, this
theoretical assumption is often false since the enterprise can predict its ultimate
taxation with a fair degree of accuracy based on prior experience, and adjust its
receipts accordingly.
On the other hand, it is generally assumed that an indirect tax-such as a
sales tax or a tax on value added at each step of the production of an item by
succeeding enterprises-is passed on to the customer and not borne
economically by the producers. If both local products and imports are subject to
the same local indirect taxes, theoretically both products are economically
neutral so far as a local customer is concerned. In the same manner, exported
products should be subject to no indirect taxation in the country of production
(or such taxes should be refunded at export) and subjected to such taxation only
in the country of destination, so that the products will compete equally with
local products subject to the same tax in the destination country. This
assumption is questionable where, for example, production costs in the country
InternationalLawyer, VoL 10, No. 4
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of origin or transportation costs between the countries result in higher costs to
the foreign manufacturer, so that he cannot pass on the full burden of indirect
taxation in the destination country. The economic impact of multiple taxing
jurisdictions, while often involving primarily direct taxes, cannot be so limited.
Tax Incentives and Disincentives
A country which taxes only local source income of its tax residents may
provide a tax incentive to foreign trade and investment over domestic commerce
to the extent tax rates abroad on the foreign activities are lower than domestic
rates. A restrictive definition of tax residence also may permit a multinational
enterprise to arrange its operations so that it is not currently taxable on foreign
source income. For example, the United States generally has considered only
those corporations organized in the United States to be taxable on their worldwide income. Accordingly, the use of foreign subsidiary corporations by United
States enterprises generally defers the United States tax on foreign operations
until the income is repatriated. In addition, a country which taxes the worldwide income of its tax residents may nevertheless provide tax incentives or disincentives to foreign trade or investment by eliminating, reducing or increasing its
tax on certain types of foreign source income or activities.
International income tax harmonization is complicated further by unilateral
tax incentives and disincentives which bear little or no relation to the sound
economic performance of multinational enterprises and reflect instead
unilateral moral standards or sociological goals. For example, tax penalties and
the denial of tax incentives for enterprises participating in certain religious or
national boycotts or in certain foreign payoffs, regardless of economic distortion, have been proposed in the United States. Likewise a temporary local
employment increase in spite of comparative inefficiency may be sought by
discouraging investment abroad by local employers.
Finally, certain countries seek to encourage investment from abroad by
providing tax exemption or reduced taxation of such investment. Such benefits
may be extended to local branches of foreign enterprises, or only to locally
organized subsidiaries of such enterprises. However, the efficiency of such incentives may be impaired in the absence of a similar tax credit or reduction
against the home country tax on the worldwide income of the foreign enterprise.
Such local tax exemption may also be employed by a tax haven country simply
to attract the organization of local subsidiaries to do business or hold investments in other countries, with license and professional fees being the principal
benefit for the haven.
Transfer Pricing
The lack of international tax harmonization may often be manipulated to the
advantage of a multinational enterprise through pricing policies of related
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 10, No. 4
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enterprises. By carefully arranging transactions between such related
enterprises, high prices may be charged for goods and services flowing to an
entity operating in a high tax country. For example, a subsidiary in a high tax
country may be charged for raw materials at a price which greatly exceeds the
market price for the materials or the price charged for the materials to other
subsidiaries in lower or no tax jurisdictions. In this case, the subsidiary's high
cost of goods sold reduces its taxable income. In other cases, a parent enterprise
may lend funds to a subsidiary in a high tax country at high interest rates. The
additional interest costs also reduce the subsidiary's taxable income.
In reverse situations, the income of enterprises in low tax countries may be
purposely increased. For example, the enterprise may sell goods to a subsidiary
in a lower or no-tax country at a low price, perhaps even at a price resulting in a
loss for the selling enterprise. Or it may lend money or provide services to such a
subsidiary at no cost. In these cases, taxable income in the high tax country is
held down while the subsidiary with which the dealings take place reaps the
profits.
Tax Administration, Information
And Enforcement
The multiplicity of rules for the taxation of multinational enterprises is
further complicated by the difficulties of administration in the various countries
involved. Generally the level of sophistication shown in the administration of a
national tax system reflects the relative economic development of the country.
Developing countries simply cannot devote the same number and quality of
personnel to the administration of their tax systems as do most developed
countries. Accordingly many countries lack the information and expertise to
administer effectively their tax systems in the same manner as, for example, the
United States. In certain cases these variations in administration are easily
exploited by taxpayers using low or no tax jurisdictions and local secrecy laws.
In other cases, however, developing countries have reacted to their
administrative problems by imposing a broad range of restrictions on investments from abroad, including high withholding taxes on payments flowing out
of the country.
Further difficulties arise from the traditional reluctance of countries to
provide local information or enforcement for the fiscal laws of another country.
The consequent uncertain manner in which the tax laws of a particular country
will be administered and enforced further distorts the flow of goods and capital
among countries.
Unilateral Approaches to Tax Harmonization
The basic issues above underlie substantially all present and proposed
approaches to the income taxation of multinational enterprises. Certain issues
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 10, No. 4
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present contradictory goals so that one principle may compromise another. This
is particularly obvious in choosing between the two basic principles of tax
neutrality, or in adopting a tax incentive or disincentive rather than tax
neutrality.
Credit or Deductionfor Foreign Taxes
One basic unilateral approach to international tax harmonization is to grant
a deduction from worldwide income or a credit against the home country tax on
foreign source income for foreign taxes paid on such income by the multinational enterprise. A deduction provides only partial harmonization, since the
home country tax is reduced by only a portion of the foreign taxes. In the case of
the foreign tax credit, if the foreign tax rate is lower than the home country rate,
only the excess of the home country tax over the foreign tax on the foreign
income is payable to the home country. If the foreign tax rate is higher, the
home country foregoes tax on the income. However, the credit generally is
limited to the amount of home country tax on the foreign income with respect to
which the foreign taxes are paid, so the credit does not affect home country tax
on domestic income. The home country may require the income and credit
limitation of each foreign country to be calculated separately, or may permit
high and low taxes of various foreign countries to be combined and so averaged
over all foreign source income. The home country may also permit excess
foreign tax to be carried over for possible credit in a prior or subsequent year.
Certain countries grant a credit only for foreign taxes imposed directly on the
enterprise, such as taxes on foreign branch operations and withholding taxes on
investment income. Other countries such as the United States also allow an
indirect credit for taxes paid by a substantially owned foreign corporation to the
extent the previously taxed profits are distributed in the form of dividends to the
parent corporation. The effect of the foreign tax credit, together with possible
carryovers of excess credits to other years, is to subject the enterprise's foreign
source income to total income taxes at least equal to the home country tax rate
on domestic source income. Accordingly a tax incentive in favor of foreign over
domestic investment is avoided.
However, double taxation often arises where an enterprise is required to
compute taxable income in the country where foreign activities are carried on,
in a different manner from the computation in the enterprise's home country.
For example, the home country may require deductions for expenses such as
start-up costs while the source country requires the capitalization of those
expenses, i.e., disallows a current deduction for the expenses. This frequently
occurs in the conduct of mineral operations. In other cases, the home country
may permit the enterprise to consolidate the income and losses from its entire
operations while the source country of a particular income item may not allow
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the use of losses arising outside that country. Similar problems also arise where
home and source country rules differ as to the determination of gross income.
The home country may require the enterprise to report income on the accrual
basis while the source country may allow the enterprise to report income only
when it is actually received. In all of these cases, under a system which employs
the foreign tax credit to eliminate double taxation of foreign source income and
limits the credit in proportion to the amount of the enterprise's foreign source
income as computed under the home country's rules, double taxation may
continue. For example, where the home country requires deductions which are
not allowed in the source country, the home country's foreign tax credit for the
income taxed in the source country will be greatly reduced.
A contrary example of the lack of tax credit harmony is the deduction in the
home country of a foreign source loss by a multinational enterprise without a
carryforward of the loss under foreign law to reduce further foreign income
taxes. Hence foreign creditable taxes in both years may remain high although a
home country deduction was also taken for the loss. However, in the United
States the recapture of tax on such a foreign loss out of future foreign income by
limiting the foreign tax credit on such income has been proposed.
Furthermore, from the viewpoint of a country which provides local tax
exemptions or reduced taxation to encourage investment from abroad, the
foreign tax credit is often defective in that the benefits of tax incentives accrue to
the home country's treasury when the income is repatriated rather than to the
multinational enterprise for which they were designed. One possible variation is
to grant a home country credit not only for foreign taxes paid directly or
indirectly by the enterprise, but for foreign taxes spared by the foreign country
as part of its tax incentive program, i.e., a tax sparing credit. Another variation
is the extension of a home country investment tax credit, or deductible
investment allowance or investment reserve, to foreign investment by a multinational enterprise. In this case, as opposed to the tax sparing credit, the home
country rather than the foreign country controls directly the amount of tax
incentive.
Exemption Method
A second basic unilateral approach is to exempt all foreign source income
from home country taxation, or apply reduced home country tax rates to such
income. Certain countries use this method particularly where an establishment
abroad is subject to foreign taxation, or a foreign subsidiary already subjected
to foreign tax on its income remits dividends to the home country enterprise. In
these cases, considerable attention is focused on the source of income so that
losses or expenses which relate to exempted or reduced rate income are not
charged against taxable domestic earnings. Tax neutrality is achieved in that
InternationalLawyer,Vol. 10, No. 4
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the multinational enterprise is taxed by the foreign country substantially as are
enterprises from other countries deriving income from similar assets or activities
in the same physical locale or source. However, this method provides a tax
incentive to foreign trade and investment over domestic commerce where the tax
rates abroad on the foreign activities are lower than home country rates.
Current Taxation of Subsidiary Earnings
Toward the opposite extreme, the principle of current worldwide taxation of
home country residents on the basis of their respective abilities to pay may be
extended so that even the income of a foreign subsidiary when earned is taxable
on an accrual basis to its shareholders in their home countries. For example, the
United States, Canada and Germany have attempted to curb certain tax
avoidance techniques by current taxation of domestic shareholders on certain
types of undistributed income of foreign subsidiaries, particularly investment
income and income generated by subsidiaries located in tax havens. Likewise
current taxation to the trust grantor of income of certain foreign trusts created
by United States persons has been proposed, as well as current taxation to
United States shareholders of all foreign subsidiaries' income. Taxation on such
an accrual basis does not produce tax neutrality as among various investors in
the same physical locale or source, since their home country taxation may vary
substantially. However, substantial tax neutrality between foreign investment
and domestic investment in the home country may be achieved if a foreign tax
credit is provided for foreign taxes paid directly or indirectly on the accrued
income.

Bilateral and Multilateral Approaches
To Tax Harmonization
Inadequacy of UnilateralMethods
The unilateral relief of double taxation automatically introduces a considerable degree of international income tax harmonization. However, unilateral
measures are inadequate to deal with certain important problems-technical
limitations in the relief offered by national laws, the home country cost of
bearing the principal tax loss where a foreign tax credit or deduction is used,
high source country withholding taxes which lead to the loss of home country
foreign tax credits, settlement of transfer pricing disputes, exchange of
information and other matters.
The possibilities for reducing aggregate tax liabilities through transfer pricing
have made such pricing the single most important issue in the taxation of multinational operations in recent years. The United States, for example, polices the
charges imposed between related parties under "arm's-length" principles. Most
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other countries have adopted similar rules which, in general, require that
related enterprises deal with each other as though they were unrelated.
The difficulty with the imposition of arm's-length standards on a unilateral
basis is simply that two countries may disagree as to what is a proper arm'slength charge. Where income or deductions are redetermined by the tax
authorities of one country, double taxation can occur if the other country does
not make an offsetting adjustment. For example, if a parent enterprise in
country A sells widgets to its country B subsidiary at $100 each, and the tax
authorities of country A determine that the sale price should have been $200
each (thus increasing A's income by $100 per widget), double taxation results
unless country B allows the subsidiary to increase its cost of goods sold to $200
(from the $100 actually paid). Absent agreement between countries A and B,
there will be double taxation of the same income and, depending on the tax
rates involved, the total tax may equal or exceed the income on the transaction.
Ironically it is precisely where country B's tax on the subsidiary is significant, so
that tax reduction by shifting profits to the subsidiary is unlikely, that the
highest double taxation will result. Most countries are simply unwilling to
forego an increase in tax collections because of the failure of another country to
make correlative adjustments in respect of their redeterminations of income.
Problems of this nature can only be solved through bilateral agreements
between taxing jurisdictions.
Bilateral Tax Treaties
To resolve these questions effectively, many countries have entered into
bilateral income tax treaties. The United States, for example, is a party to over
30 income tax treaties with other countries. Altogether, there are over 200 income
tax treaties among the developed and developing countries of the world. The
United States treaties, and the treaties of the other developed countries,
generally follow the Draft Double Taxation Convention on Income and Capital
adopted in 1963 by the Fiscal Committee of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development. This model treaty and most other bilateral
income tax treaties generally establish rules for:
" the determination of income (including allowable deductions) for branch
operations in a country conducted by residents of the other country;
" the kind of activities giving rise to taxation in a country;
" the reduction of withholding taxes on dividends, interest and royalties;
* the establishment of arm's-length pricing rules;
" the taxation of income from personal services;
* the allowance of foreign tax credits or the exemption of income from tax;
" the exchange of information and establishment of dispute settlement and
enforcement procedures; and
InternationalLawyer, VoL 10, No. 4
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0 non-discrimination protection.
The number of bilateral agreements dealing with these matters is rapidly
increasing, and for the near future they will form the basis of further income tax
harmonization.
MultilateralAgreements
Tax harmonization on a multilateral basis is developing more slowly. The
members of the European Economic Community have placed the harmonization of tax systems and rates-including a uniform system of value added taxes,
and of integrated corporation and shareholder taxation-high on the agenda for
future action, as cited above.
An equally important development is now taking place with regard to international tax enforcement. The growing network of bilateral income tax treaties
have set the stage for a multilateral exchange of information among countries
having tax treaties with each other, and in certain cases information is already
being so exchanged. The recent "Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises"
issued by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, cited
above, also state with respect to taxation that multinational enterprises should:
(1) upon request of the taxation authorities of the countries in which they operate,
provide, in accordance with the safeguards and relevant procedures of the national
laws of these countries, the information necessary to determine correctly the taxes
to be assessed in connection with their operations, including relevant information
concerning their operations in other countries;
(2) refrain from making use of the particular facilities available to them, such as
transfer pricing which does not conform to an arm's length standard, for
modifying in ways contrary to national laws the tax base on which members of the
group are assessed.
While the guidelines are voluntary, they are likely to be adopted in whole or part
by a number of multinational enterprises, and express the growing
multinational interest in increased taxpayer information and monitoring of
intercompany transactions.
Certain multinational groups have imposed new restrictions on investment
and trade from abroad, including tax disincentives, such as those under the
proposed Andean Investment Code.' However, the expanded activities of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the United
Nations in international income tax harmonization, cited above, seem likely to
encourage individual countries to focus more on the benefits of such harmonization for both national tax revenues and increased investment from abroad.
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Conclusion

Clearly the accommodation of the basic issues of multiple taxing jurisdictions, tax incentives and disincentives, transfer pricing, and tax administration
and enforcement must generate further unilateral, bilateral and multilateral
approaches to the income taxation of multinational enterprises. A successful
accommodation may also alter the emphasis of such taxation, for a basic goal of
most national income taxation of multinational enterprises in recent years has
been prevention of tax reduction or avoidance. For example, high withholding
taxes attempt to offset administrative difficulties, transfer pricing which shifts
profits to a low tax country is penalized by potential double taxation upon
redetermination, and the mandatory allocation of expenses to foreign source
income reduces the home country foreign tax credit on the income taxed at a
lower home country rate.
However, where foreign tax rates commence to approximate or exceed the
particular taxing country's rate, such prevention is less crucial. Furthermore, as
export trade and foreign investment by a particular country become more nearly
balanced or exceeded by important trade and investment from abroad, a tax
rule mandating high export transfer pricing or allocation of substantial
expenses to foreign source income conversely reduces the country's tax revenue
on such inward trade and investment. Similarly, tax rules which may increase or
accelerate the gain on a transaction due to a revaluation between two currencies
will also increase or accelerate a tax loss on a devaluation. Accordingly a focus
on economic neutrality in income taxation of multinational enterprises, rather
than penalties or immediate tax maximization, may ultimately serve the
interests of most countries.
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